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In cities the world over we are able to determine stability in daily existence, to identify with 
our social spaces, because modes of transport have become essential components of 
subjective autonomy. But would it not be just as accurate to say that in transit modern life 
puts the self in abeyance? I argue that the ways we allow ourselves to be moved around in 
‘traffic space’ creates a passivity that renders almost invisible the complex mechanics of 
movement, which we only become alert to at the moment of breakdown, precisely when they 
become a threat to autonomy. Our trafficking, I conclude, has an almost narcotic effect, 
rendering us immobile against the continual movements that constitute urban life, one that 
also magnifies out of all proportion the accidents or aberrations that sometimes disturb our 
traffic space, making it seem as if we may easily descend into an uncontrollable chaos. 
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A B S T R A C T  
In cities the world over we are able to determine stability in daily existence, to identify with our 
social spaces, because modes of transport have become essential components of subjective 
autonomy. But would it not be just as accurate to say that in transit modern life puts the self in 
abeyance? I argue that the ways we allow ourselves to be moved around in ‘traffic space’ cre-
ates a passivity that renders almost invisible the complex mechanics of movement, which we 
only become alert to at the moment of breakdown, precisely when they become a threat to au-
tonomy. Our trafficking, I conclude, has an almost narcotic effect, rendering us immobile 
against the continual movements that constitute urban life, one that also magnifies out of all 
proportion the accidents or aberrations that sometimes disturb our traffic space, making it 
seem as if we may easily descend into an uncontrollable chaos. 
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T H E  I N V I S I B L E  M A C H I N E R Y 
Traffic, as we know, concerns movement. Because it concerns movement the rela-
tionship traffic mediates between self and space is one of dispersal, or transience. 
In other words, traffic might be better thought of as a kind of non-relation that in 
its mobility is always after some destination; a point where some, let us say, au-
thentic relation is affirmed as the closure in the very opening of a space that our 
movement creates. Traffic thus postulates an existence that is caught between 
places, seemingly incomplete, and always subject to change. It exists, at times, in 
what one observer has termed the ‘non-places’ of contemporary society where we 
encounter an overlooked yet important part of modern experience in such ‘dense 
networks of means of transport,’ which propel us to the ends of the particular, to 
‘solitary individuality, to the fleeting, the temporary and ephemeral’ (Augé, 1995: 
78).  
The space of traffic might also be symbolic of the frailty of our expectations, 
which, within the context of the urban, are a kind of invisible social glue rendered 
effective by our trust in others. If taking a trip is almost to wager on these expecta-
tions, the question is then how we manage to forget this for most of the time; how, 
through force of habit, the movement of the self is pushed to the margins of our 
perceptual awareness – even as we move?  
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Some three and a half centuries ago the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes re-
lated the nature of movement to the human condition in general, but more particu-
larly to social and political subjectivity (Hobbes, 1991). In Hobbes’ conception of 
the individuated subject – internal motion in matter – experience was taken to re-
volve around a succession of desires and aversions that, in spatio-physical terms, 
would compel the individual to engage in specific external movements as a result of 
coming within physical proximity of others. After outlining the dangerous conse-
quences of human motion continuing unhindered amongst individuals who would 
do almost anything to ensure their own safety and security, but who had been 
brought together in society, he reflected on the problem of what conditions might 
permit the accommodation of potentially conflicting movements to take place 
(Hobbes, 1991: 125). The solution he devised was an external and sovereign au-
thority (much like contemporary legal authorities) onto which the control of 
movement would be, in effect, displaced. The hypothesized sovereign would then 
become a means of trafficking movement, and more significantly for our purposes, 
could represent also the formal and substantial embodiment of the disposal of cer-
tain doubts and uncertainties (over fear of life and limb, the dread of living through 
incommodious times, and so on).  
But how does this conceptualization of subjectivity as a kind of controlled 
movement related to the condition we find ourselves in today? It is not immediate-
ly clear how Hobbes’ ideas can relate to a quite distinctive contemporary under-
standing of space and traffic that has been conditioned by modernity; which is to 
say, by the existence of railways, automobiles and air travel. But, one way to see the 
link is to think about our place in the system of waste disposal: just as the flush of a 
toilet removes for each of us the question of what to do with our waste (it ‘vanishes’ 
to be taken care of by the invisible machinery of society) so the availability of some 
form of movement control (such as contemporary traffic technologies) erases the 
anxiety or insecurity we may feel when caught, in motion, between places. 
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1. Trafficking on Route 1, near Soquel, California, 2000 (John Scanlan) 
 
 
Hobbes is perhaps an unusual point of departure in positing the causes of our 
experience of traffic as the merely instrumental means to an end, but the work of 
this thinker, who died several centuries ago, illuminates our speculations on why 
our trafficking – particularly the spaces between stations and the space of move-
ment – can be so forgettable. Within the Hobbesian elaboration of materialist psy-
chology we can glimpse how the subjective control of what he called ‘internal mo-
tions’ becomes, precisely because of the consequences of our objective social ex-
istence, the basis for social relationships, which first propel individual movement 
and then shunt it towards some rational convergence of interests. We might say, 
then, that in the relation of individual to world a certain element of passivity devel-
ops as a result of the displacement of obligations onto the hypothetical sovereign 
(which, in modern terms we read as the dispersed ‘machinery’ of society; the divi-
sion of labour, knowledge, and other such convergences of interest). What relates 
to our contemporary understanding of how passage is mediated through space is 
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that the idea of motion itself implies the need for some control over space, simply 
because all movement is movement in space. Socialization, in effect, develops as a 
way of trafficking what Hobbes called our desires and aversions – the drives that 
bring us into contact with each other – and establishes the parameters of action, 
developing into a more or less closed causal domain in which our expectations are 
sustained.  
It was motion that provided the grounds for the Hobbesian rational binding of 
desire under the sovereign (both an attachment to security and the source of hab-
it), an idea that signalled one of the earliest justifications for the substitution of 
seemingly unfettered freedom with some form of social contract (Hobbes, 1991: 
147). Where this rational binding established the subject-object boundaries of 
Hobbesian political philosophy, it is curiously mirrored in contemporary urban 
society by our dependency on the reasonableness of the instrumental means of 
moving our bodies, our selves, around. In other words, the rational engenders a 
need for more of the same and freedom thus becomes at one with the trafficking of 
space. Such dependency not only puts to one side various doubts and uncertain-
ties; it might also leave us in a slumber we are only awoken from when something 
apparently random, aberrant or accidental happens. As the increased anxiety over 
transport and travel since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 perhaps 
shows, we are now more aware than at any time in the recent past that when we 
travel we rely on the proper functioning of some invisible machinery.  
It is perhaps timely, then, to look at the psychology of social expectations 
through the example of movement, and to consider how traffic technologies, on 
the one hand, enable us to shut ourselves off from the environment we move 
around in – yet, on the other, reveal with disproportionate effect that our traffick-
ing conceals an alternative and uncontrollable teleology in which our everyday ex-
pectations are thrown back into the kind of doubt that impelled the creation of 
Hobbesian sovereign in the first place.  
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T H E  P A S S E N G E R 
Every morning at 08:05 a passenger train would leave Carstairs for Glasgow, its 
destination some thirty miles away in Central Scotland. Unusually, it was the only 
passenger train to begin its journey from this station, carrying the small number of 
commuters who lived in the town. The lack of frequency in this sparse schedule 
alone was the cause of a great deal of confusion, especially amongst train drivers 
for whom encounters with this particular route would be rare and, consequently, 
never fully solidified into the kind of habitual awareness that characterized the ease 
with which more familiar routes were undertaken. An equally notable consequence 
of these circumstances was the apparent conviction of passengers waiting at the 
first station stop down the line; that this train – the 08:05 – would first collect and 
then deposit them safely in the city and conveniently within reach of their final des-
tinations.  
The extent to which the passengers had come to rely on events following the pre-
scribed course was evident in their own absent-mindedness. There was no need to 
fret over details like the arrival of the train (though it may occasionally run a few 
minutes late), and so people might stand around on the platform reading newspa-
pers, talk with fellow passengers, or retreat into the enclosure of some small bub-
ble of personal space entered through the invitation of a portable device (these 
days, perhaps, a cell phone – then, the Walkman). These are the facts. I was wit-
ness, indeed, to the minor eruptions that unsettled the placid expectations of the 
passengers on those rare occasions when the 08:05 from Carstairs would (from 
my position inside the clerk’s office where I worked) mercilessly thunder through 
my station, the driver having no knowledge that this was a stop on his route. Sitting 
blankly in his cab, perhaps, he could have no regard either for the torrent of com-
plaints that would, mere moments later, be volleyed across the tracks at me as I 
stood on the platform to shout across that yes, dear passengers your train just tore  
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2. Advert for a portable Sony Minidisc player, c. 2002 
 
 
through this station and through your plans, and no, it would not be able to reverse 
and the only thing to do, therefore, was wait until the next one came along. 
What such incidents speak of is the extent to which we – the urban dwellers, in 
particular – tacitly accept that normal social functioning rests on being able to dis-
pel doubts about our movements beyond the spaces we may control. This ac-
ceptance is manifest in the external form of the structures, networks, and people 
who enable us to move around, yet who also easily blend into the background. It is 
the socially necessary reliance on numerous unknown or forgotten relationships 
with strangers that allows us to dispose of the uncertainties that arise any time we 
move from one space and into another. And like the attention we pay to the loco-
motion of the human body, we often only become fully conscious of movement 
within the urban environment when it breaks down, or if it encounters obstacles.  
When our trafficking is interrupted what we are able to glimpse is the alternate, 
suppressed, network of causes in which we passengers are really caught (as op-
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posed to the illusion that we control our movements – which in any case emanates 
from the same external source). It is then we become aware of the directing hand of 
invisible control, just when it fails to control. The curious thing, however, is that 
we manage to overcome the fact that we can so easily be returned to a condition 
where these causal expectations are shattered; so much so, in fact, that the fact of 
our social interconnectedness at such times comes as a shocking denial of self. 
How do we passengers become so passive? One answer may be found in a well-
known section of Either/Or (‘On the Rotation of Crops’), where Søren Kierke-
gaard suggested that without the occasional replacement of daily experience the 
customary obligations and expectations that consequently develop as a part of 
normality come to constitute a kind of deadly continuity that ‘like the wind and 
weather’ moves us by some external force which, from the subjective perspective, 
at least, is ‘completely indeterminable’ (Kierkegaard, 2000: 59). Habit, in other 
words, makes us passive subjects. Yet routine and habit are more grounded in who 
we are than the arbitrary sway of natural forces might suggest. This is because the 
apparent continuity of the objective social world projects a psychological re-
orientation of space and time; it consists in the adjustment of consciousness within 
the causal expectations of the environment. Thus, the passivity of the passenger in 
this traffic space develops through the interiorization of movement control (‘let the 
train take the strain,’ ran a 1990s advert for British Rail), and is further reinforced 
in the individual’s occupancy of what – borrowing an idea from Harvie Ferguson – 
is a ‘third space.’ A space that is identifiable with neither subjective nor objective 
images of the individuated self, but that develops as a response to ‘the continuous 
flux of subjectivity,’ which in Ferguson’s example threatens the image of the body 
as centred and immanently directed (Ferguson, 2000: 45). In the case of traffic 
space a similar response is the result of one’s being caught in this non-identical 
flow of passage.  
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And so whilst the rationally directed traffic assumes a totalizing power that would 
dominate the ordering of space, the objective image of the city produced as a con-
sequence remains essentially duplicitous in terms of how it relies on the visibility 
of masks and surfaces. In Geoff Ryman’s amusing novel 253, a passenger-by-
passenger account of the thoughts of two hundred and fifty-three people aboard a 
London underground train, we see the extent to which we are, as Marshall Berman 
said of such situations, a ‘multitude of solitudes’ (Berman, 1983: 164). Thrown 
together in the passive domain of traffic space, the potential anxiety of being una-
ble to identify with either subjective or objective images of who we are speaks of 
how we populate each others solitude, and is contained and appropriated within 
the notion of Ferguson’s ‘third space,’ which develops as a response to the threat 
of existential dispersal (Ferguson, 2000: 45-46). In Ryman’s tripartite characteri-
zation of the passengers on his fictional train, the last image seems to correspond 
to this third space (the other two offering more or less objective and subjective im-
ages). Thus, of passenger number eleven in the first car of the train (‘Mr Douglas 
Highbee’), we learn the following: 
 
Outward appearance [i.e., Objective] 
Blandly British, about thirty, plump, moustache, no chin. Black trousers, huge 
winter coat, blue shirt collar. A large overnight case. Appears to be asleep, ex-
cept that one eye is open. 
 
Inside information [Subjective] 
Mr Higbee is the bar piano player on a cross-Channel ferry. His bag contains a 
change of underwear, a top hat, and home-produced cassettes which he offers 
for sale at the top of his piano. No one ever buys them. Like Superman, his cos-
tume, a tuxedo, is under the ordinary coat. 
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What he is doing or thinking [‘Third space’] 
He is trying to avoid having to talk to the ship’s magician, Passenger 18, who is 
also in the same carriage. Douglas has nothing against the magician. They have 
to spend a lot of time in the same bar and cabin being professionally pleasant to 
each other. You hardly want to be pleasant all the way from Waterloo to Dover 
as well. Douglas finds it difficult to be pleasant. (Ryman, 1998: 24) 
 
The conditions which permit one to occupy this traffic space, of course, rely on 
our passivity; on the conditions of social existence that belong to unseen or forgot-
ten relationships. In terms of my own experience of the habits of the passenger, I 
was to become further removed from encounters with those angry individuals, 
rudely reminded of the interdependency of their lives by the simple mistake of an 
absent-minded train driver. I disappeared into the background – to the anonymity 
of the signal centre, with its instruments of motion control. In retrospect I had 
moved from the position of witness to a kind of Hobbesian chaos to the position of 
Hobbesian sovereignty. Within my limited domain of control (amounting only to a 
few miles, I admit) I operated the switches and levers of my equipment in an effort 
to ensure the traffic did not upset this third space of the passenger, and instead 
obeyed the rational order of the timetables and diagrams that allowed me to regu-
late the potential chaos. 
 
 
T H E  V E H I C L E 
The objective topography of the city is not the object of any singular experience. 
Instead, its shape and form are the preserve of a privileged and disembodied ob-
server (i.e., one who does not really exist) removed to a distance suitable enough 
to produce the scope of objectification for an entity the size of a city. Such an im-
age of the city as a total entity is, then, clearly at some remove from the finely  
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3. Godfrey Reggio, Koyaanisqatsi 
 
 
grained ‘reality’ of the city given content by subjective movements. Yet, it is the 
objective views that carry much weight, and that are omnipresent due to the repre-
sentations of photography, maps and even 3D models (of the kind one might see in 
a tourist office). Particularly interesting versions of this kind of objectification 
might be observed in the cityscapes captured by use of the moving image, which 
correspondingly reveal the shifting surface of the urban topos. In Godfrey Reg-
gio’s 1983 documentary Koyaanisqatsi, a film that glories in the endless traffick-
ing of urban movement within contemporary life, we gain an insight into a per-
spective that surpasses the abstraction of the map as representation of the city, one 
we may suggest that corresponds to the vision of an all-seeing God (or, indeed, the 
Hobbesian sovereign). What we notice is that because of the distance of the view-
ing eye (the camera) the motions observed from this perspective fail to register the 
insignificant and irregular deviations from the largely well-ordered norm, present-
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ing an image of urban life under rational control, which for the most part corre-
sponds to our expectations of movement (if not to our hopes of a smooth passage 
between stations). Yet, just as the appearance, expression and behaviour of fellow 
passengers on a journey might not indicate anything of real substance about them, 
so too, the God-like vision of urban movement is somewhat misleading – it is all 
surface and no depth. A particularly illuminating sequence in Koyaanisqatsi illus-
trates this by taking the viewer from the distantly observed topography of Los An-
geles at night, dominated by the neon ‘tubes’ of flowing traffic that at various 
points stutters, stops, and then begins to move again, to the interior of a station, 
viewed as a container of anonymous bodies coming and going in all directions as if 
without aim, but always avoiding the obstacles formed by the movements of others; 
always with enough unconscious co-operation going on that such a throng never 
descends further into a disordered rabble. Visions like this one highlight the way 
in which the closer we are to such movements the more confusing they can seem to 
be, and the more the environment seems to exist simply as the vehicle for our un-
ending movements.  
A narrowing of perspective filters out the origins and destinations of our jour-
neys, and casts the human traffic within a causal vacuum, as if – in confirmation of 
Kierkegaard’s fears – blown around by the wind, or moved by some other unseen 
elemental force. Here the regularity of movement when distantly observed through 
the God’s-eye lens of the filmmaker becomes, within the more focused perspec-
tive, the random movement of bodies within some temporary traffic space – and 
beyond this the ‘third space’ of unseen thoughts and guarded individuality.  
In the relationship between these social atoms and society it is urban planning 
that has intervened – through its arrangement of spaces – as the mediator of spatial 
consciousness, if not source of the practical and unified image of the city as vehicle 
for our movements. Such an image is captured by our knowledge of the places, 
buildings and traffic schedules that all exist as points of identity within the fluidity 
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of urban motion. Such a knowledge may only comprise a part of the overall mosaic 
of images or knowledges that are found in a representation of objective totality, 
but it can be exchanged or shared, which is what happens when you take a train, a 
taxi, or ask for directions (Lynch, 1960: 46-48). Our capacity for combining in-
formation about time and space through the use of the experiences and knowledge 
of others has its objective counterpart in the public transport timetables, which on 
a far greater scale also strive for, and depend on, the real possibility of charting 
time over space. The discontinuity between subjective experience and objective 
image lies in the fact that where one may experience, as Christine Boyer noted, 
‘spatial interruptions, fractures, and lags’ in the city as vehicle, these represent 
exceptions to the controllable motion that is suggested by the obstacle-less maps 
and sovereign transport schedules, which will declare themselves with all the cer-
tainty of fact (Boyer, 1994: 490-91). Whilst such exceptions to smooth and or-
dered functioning do not amount to the kind of chaos common to some nine-
teenth-century cities, the fact is that within the last century the spaces we move 
within, as Marshall Berman wrote, ‘have been systematically designed and orga-
nized to ensure that collisions and confrontations will not take place’ (Berman, 
1983: 164). At this point we should note that different kinds of travel generate 
their own psychological responses. There are marked differences, for example, 
between the everyday experience of traffic as a passenger (where the responsibility 
for our movement is vested in others), and going on the road – which is to take a 
more active and directing role in movement.  
In popular imagination the open road symbolizes something quite distinct from 
the kind of urban trafficking already considered; it promises the quick erasure of 
one’s past – in ‘hitting the road’ one might get caught up in traffic, but as in the 
Ray Charles song (‘hit the road, Jack, and don’t you come back no more’) a line 
may be drawn under experience in order to separate oneself from the deadly conti-
nuity Kierkegaard observed in habits and customs. A certain idealized vision of the 
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road, unsurprisingly, invests it with a ‘libertarian ideal’ of unfettered free move-
ment (Williams, 2001). Thus, ‘driving’ – as opposed to travelling as a passenger – 
also describes voyages of discovery or possibly disorientation (consider the use of 
the word trip to describe the early experiments with the drug LSD) because the 
extension of a space beyond existing spatio-temporal conditions suggests a mode 
of transcendence. How often do we visualize a road backwards rather than think of 
‘the road’ as the forward extension of a space that speaks of possibility? The ques-
tion seems pointless because once on the road we are – because of the nature of 
things – always physically moving forward (even when in retreat), and the more 
refined the lines that draw us forward become the greater the trafficking that con-
sciousness is subjected to. A road through open space symbolizes untrammelled 
freedom in one sense because it remains free from the lines within lines that char-
acterize traffic control in the cities. Yet, because of the way that familiarity lapses 
into automatic behaviour, it is the ubiquitous traffic controls of the city and not 
possibilities of the open road that are filtered out of consciousness (the obligation 
to obey – to follow – of course, marks the development of habitual responses). The 
road less travelled contains novelty and is therefore usually more remarkable.  
Traffic and directional signals of the kind we find wherever people are crowded 
together become at times almost invisible – which is surely one of the reasons why 
travellers at airports and stations are also subjected to continual reminders to obey 
commands that are already present as visual reminders everywhere (‘don’t park in 
the drop zone’; ‘don’t leave your luggage unattended’; ‘stay clear of the end of the 
platform,’ and so on). Other examples of our narrowed perception under condi-
tions of familiarity are found where the slightest modification is made to routes 
that pass through a regulated environment. In France, as Marc Augé has written, 
the introduction of the roundabout (sometimes known as a ‘traffic circle’ or ‘rota-
ry’) was the cause of the kind of mishaps that belie our urban blindness: 
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Incredulous drivers who refused to acknowledge roundabouts, or who couldn’t 
believe their eyes, planted their vehicles in the central floral arrangement, or 
crashed them against statues or other artistic constructions supposedly deco-
rating them (Augé, 2002: 293-295). 
 
We understand in similar terms a short news report of 18 February 2001 in the 
London Observer that ‘vandals caused traffic chaos in Totland, Isle of Wight, after 
they left eight road signs pointing the wrong way.’ Such gestures, which hark after 
the spirit of the Situationist détournement (diversion) in their misappropriation of 
the symbols of the leisure economy, produce their own ‘chaos’ because of the dis-
proportionate effect they can have; and perhaps because what is brought to our 
attention in being caught up in confusing scenarios are the aspects of social life 
that remain beyond our ability to anticipate or control (Sadler, 1998: 17).  
 
 
T H E  F I X 
Consider the justly famous diagrammatic map of London Underground. This map 
was designed by an engineer named Harry Beck in 1933, and presents a visual ar-
rangement of its particulars in a way that sticks in the mind’s eye – in the rather 
simple form, colour, and graphical arrangement of its features is displayed a well-
ordered image of the city of London in which all its parts have been equally spaced 
for your convenience (or so it seems), as if a sovereign designer had actually rear-
ranged the city as a model of harmony. This map brilliantly demonstrates the hope 
of order over the fragmented and disjunctive reality of London; a city of unex-
pected dead-ends, alluring avenues and hopeful trails that will magnetically pull 
one off-course (Sinclair and Atkins, 1990). It is, Adrian Forty suggests, somewhat 
duplicitous in its vision of good order: 
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4. Harry Beck with his London Underground map 
 
 
For all its clarity, it is highly misleading; unlike the previous maps, which repre-
sented stations in their correct geographical positions, the new map not only re-
organised the lines along horizontal, vertical or 45 degree axes, but also en-
larged the distance between the stations in the central area, and reduced that be-
tween stations in the outer area … by making the distance between the suburbs 
and the centre look so small [it] induced people to undertake journeys they 
might have otherwise hesitated to make (Forty, 1986: 237). 
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The map resembles an electrical circuit diagram, and looks very much like the 
displays that are found in the signal centres where rail traffic is controlled. Yet, 
however misleading it is, the image of this ordered space has become part of a 
common perception of London. Its success is found in the fact that the urban to-
pography is thus refashioned as an objectified form that supports our movements, 
one that comes complete with temporary relations of identity (in the form of sta-
tions and interchanges) that substantiate our everyday causal expectations (meet-
ing a friend; getting to work on time, and so on), and which carry forward the life of 
both individual and city. The London Underground map might stand as a meta-
phor for our optimistic perceptions of space and traffic, and reminds us that it was 
the planners of twentieth-century urban space who represented a kind of Modern-
ism that appropriated some of the functions of a Hobbesian-style sovereign. These 
technocratic masters of space and motion, indeed, were ‘scientists’ of the human 
imagination, claiming to pursue a vision that had as a central aim the fashioning of 
human minds through the directing control of movement (Reiner, 1967: 232).  
The success of transport authorities, planners, or designers in fashioning the im-
agination of the passenger is reflected in a corresponding lack of awareness about 
how easily things so constituted may break down, and this is summed up by our 
travel passivity. The unseen machinery of trafficking becomes invisible for the very 
good reason that it largely works in convincing us that our freedom is expressed 
through movement. As contemporary society strives harder to more efficiently or-
ganize movement, and gets better at doing it, the thought occurs that we become 
more habitual in our occupancy of traffic space. Perhaps, as Avital Ronell has sug-
gested, the structure of modern life is actually narcotic, produces levels of addic-
tion or dependence (Ronell, 1992).  
As we retreat into the ‘third space’ we accept the trafficking of our movements, 
and so the habit develops. To use a drug analogy, traffic is a downer. Whilst appar-
ently taking us on our various trips, it renders us largely immobile, leaves us insuf-
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ficiently alert to our surroundings. It is for this reason – that we spend so much of 
our lives in transit – that the accidents and aberrations that occasionally trespass 
on our traffic space can become easily overstated. Because they seem to strip away 
this hope of order and return us to an almost Hobbesian chaos. 
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